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REVISITING EQUALITY: FEMINIST
THOUGHT ABOUT INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY
ANN SHALLEGK*

This panel's evaluation of Craigv. Boren' in light of United States v.
Virginia (VMZ), and its discussion of the development of the law of
equal protection for women has revealed several important aspects of
the relationship between feminist legal theory and feminist legal
practice during the last twenty years of the contemporary feminist
movement We can see how, at the beginning of this period, the
early women's rights activists' concern with achieving formal legal
equality for women animated many of the legal strategies designed to
combat discrimination and subordination.4 Through the cases they
chose to bring to court, these activists placed emphasis upon securing
for women conditions that were the same as those for men. In the
area of constitutional doctrine, they believed in the need to establish
a high burden for the state to meet to justify any differential treatment of men and women. They rooted their commitment to
achieving this rigorous scrutiny in two related concerns-first, in
their judgment that strict scrutiny enhanced the effectiveness of
challenges to discriminatory state action and, second, in the symbolism of according sex discrimination the highest level of scrutiny
available in the area of equal protection analysis.
Awaiting a decision in VMT, all the panelists continued to support
the application of strict scrutiny to claims of sex discrimination. For
them, VMfrepresented an opportunity, albeit an unsuccessful one, to
convince the Supreme Court to adopt strict scrutiny in the context of
sex discrimination. Along with the panelists' continuing concern for
* Professor of Law and Director, Women & the Law Program, Washington College of Law,
American University.
1. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
2. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter "VM/fl.
3. See Centennial Pane. Two Decades of Inte'ndiate Scrudiny, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1-30

(1997) [hereinafter "CentennialPaner'].
4. Id.
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realizing the original goal of formal equality, however, they identified
many other strands of feminist analysis that have emerged and flourished during the intervening period. These strands complicate and
enhance both the analysis of VMT and our evaluation of the level of
legal scrutiny applied by a court in evaluating a state's actions. How
critical is the level of scrutiny to the outcome of VM! and to other
cases? What is the relationship of assumptions about gender to the
formal legal standards applied to a situation? What is the symbolic
meaning of the level of scrutiny in our present conditions? As we
have come to understand how categories of race and gender are
problematic, do we need to modify our views of the legal rules and
principles that are applied to those categories? How do the paradigms of equality that underlie equal protection based on race and
gender affect gays and lesbians or other groups subjected to discriminatory treatment?
While reaffirming the continuing symbolic and political importance of strict scrutiny, Donna Lenhoff and Liz Schneider addressed
the complexity of evaluating the practical importance of the degree
of judicial scrutiny in securing equality for women. Donna placed
the effectiveness of the constitutional standard in the context of the
implementation of significant statutory protections for women, such
as Title VII6 and Tide IX,7 as well as the partial effectiveness over the
years of intermediate scrutiny in securing constitutional protection
for women. Women's rights strategists in VMI felt confident that
Virginia's attempt to create a separate institution for women would
not withstand intermediate scrutiny at the level of the Supreme
Court. Although strict scrutiny may be limited in its practical implications, Debbie Brake stressed the need to think about the impact of
constitutional doctrine, not just in the Supreme Court, but at the
level of the lower federal courts, where most litigants and their lawyers confront it. Although advocates might be reasonably confident
about victory in M under intermediate scrutiny at the Supreme
Court level, vindication came only after a long struggle in the District
Court and Fourth Circuit. Debbie stressed the role that the watereddown standard played in creating greater room for the operation of
gender stereotypes.
Liz deepened the analysis further by considering the factors other
than the level of scrutiny affecting courts' decisions about sex dis5. Id. atpp. 3-13 and pp.21-26.
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, § 701(b) 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1988).
7. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-1688 (1996).
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crimination. Deeply rooted assumptions about gender, as well as
legal standards, operate to produce results. Because stereotypical
thinking about men and women would also affect decision-making
under a strict scrutiny regime, advocates need to be constantly aware
of the interaction between legal doctrine and the understanding of
gender. Strict scrutiny might be more important for the political
message it communicates than for the role it could play in limiting
the impact of gender stereotypes in judicial decisions. Liz and
Donna also noted how the "difference" strand of feminist thought
has raised questions about when and why differential treatment of
men and women might be of value to women, and has challenged
and enriched our thinking about the meaning of equality. This
"difference" strand of feminist thought, however, has also been
misused to undermine challenges to practices that disadvantage
women. In addition, both Liz and Sharon Rush identified how feminist thought continues to grapple with the problematic character of
the categories of race and gender. A black woman subjected to
discriminatory treatment is divided against herself when a court
comes to decide upon a level of scrutiny to apply to that treatment.
These various factors-the symbolic and practical implications of
the level of constitutional scrutiny, the effect of stereotypical thinking, and the porous and shifting character of the categories by which
people are classified-also influence Sharon Rush's thinking about
obtaining meaningful constitutional scrutiny of discrimination
against gay men and lesbians. As in the struggle for women's equality, heightened constitutional scrutiny matters both symbolically and
practically in the movement for gay and lesbian rights. Furthermore,
cultural constructs of homosexuality not only shape a court's approach to discriminatory treatment of gays and lesbians, but they
have also impeded the application of any heightened level of scrutiny
to differential treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals. In
addition to these concerns, Sharon added questions about the very
process of analogical thinking that occurs as we work to build a
constitutional vision of equality.
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court in Craigv. Boren8 enunciated
intermediate scrutiny as the standard for reviewing state discrimination based on sex. This case was only a partial victory in women's
rights advocates' campaign for equality. With a continuing commitment to achieving strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for
evaluating claims of sex discrimination, this panel has identified for
us not only the abiding importance of the struggle for full equality,
8. 429 U.S. at 190.
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but also a more nuanced vision of equality that now, twenty years
later, informs the ongoing struggle.
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